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Disability Insurance (DI) programs are among the largest public transfer programs in developed coun-
tries. In the OECD, total spending on DI programs amounts to approximately 2.5% of GDP (OECD,
2010). In an attempt to reduce fiscal costs, many countries have already implemented or are considering
implementing policies designed to improve incentives to work for the programs’ beneficiaries.1 While
such policies allow beneficiaries to keep a larger share of their benefits if they engage in employment,
they typically involve a high implicit tax on earnings above an exemption threshold, creating a large
kink in the budget constraint. If labor supply responses to the kink are large, policymakers could relax
the exemption threshold or reduce the implicit tax rate to increase work effort among DI recipients. This
would improve welfare among current recipients and increase revenue from income taxes. On the other
hand, a more lenient policy might also increase expenditures on DI benefits and induce more poten-
tial applicants to apply for DI. Knowledge about recipients’ labor supply responses in such policies is
therefore crucial for optimal policy design.
The main contribution of this paper is to assess this policy trade-off by investigating intensive and
extensive margin labor supply responses of DI recipients to kinked budget sets. Two key features in
the Norwegian DI program allow me to do this. First, the kink in the benefit schedule is salient and
large in magnitude. DI beneficiaries in Norway can earn up to approximately $4,937 per annum without
losing benefits. If earnings exceed this threshold, DI benefits are reduced by approximately $2 for
every $3 in earnings above the threshold. Second, a sharp discontinuity in benefit schedules provides
a particularly attractive setting to analyze behavioral responses. As a transitional policy from prior
work incentives, recipients awarded DI before 1st of January 2015 were subject to a relaxed exemption
threshold of $8,000 until 2018.2 This sharp discontinuity in benefit schedules therefore allows me to
analyze intensive and extensive margin responses separately. I identify the intensive margin elasticity
using a non-parametric bunching design, where the sharp discontinuity allows me to observe bunching
at the kink for one group of individuals and at the same time observe the earnings distribution of a
comparison group where the implicit tax on earnings does not change. To identify extensive margin
responses, I implement a regression discontinuity design, and estimate an extensive margin elasticity
with respect to participation tax rates. In combination, the intensive and extensive margin elasticities
allow me to analyze how different benefit schedules affect overall public expenditures.
My main empirical strategy implements the theoretical framework of Blomquist et al. (2019) who
show that the earnings elasticity can be identified non-parametrically by inverting the cumulative earn-
ings distributions of two groups subject to different kinked budget sets. In my setting, identification
relies on recipients with DI award on either side of the cut-off date (i.e. 1st of January 2015) being
drawn from the same distribution of potential earnings, i.e. the earnings distributions of the two groups
would have been comparable if they were subject to the same benefit schedule. Each point in the cumula-
tive distributions of the two groups will then correspond to individuals with the same earnings potential.
This allows me to estimate the intensive margin earnings elasticity by comparing earnings of recipients
at the same point in the cumulative distributions where the marginal tax rate is different between the two
1One example is the “$1 for $2 offset” in the US that has been proposed for many years but never been implemented.
Under this policy, DI benefits would be reduced by $1 for every $2 in earnings above about $14,000 per annum. Other
examples include i.e. the “Ticket to Work” program in the UK. Switzerland tested a conditional cash program that offered DI
recipients cash payments if they expanded or stared working. Sweden introduced the so-called continuous deduction program
back in 2009.
2Before 2015, the annual exemption threshold was $12,000.
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groups. An advantage of this method is that it does not require functional form assumptions or deciding
an excluded region around the kink as in standard bunching applications. To shed light on these issues
in the standard applications, I estimate bunching responses using common strategies in the literature and
compare these with the non-parametric approach.3
A kink may also create responses along the extensive margin as it increases the average tax of
participating in the labor force.4 Therefore, if individuals have a fixed cost of labor force participation,
it is possible that the high kink at $8,000 induces some recipients to start working. To identify this
effect, I implement a regression discontinuity design which compares recipients with DI award on each
side of the cut-off date, and pin down an extensive margin elasticity with respect to participation tax
rates. Furthermore, it is possible that the extensive margin responses could affect the observed earnings
distributions, and therefore induce a bias in the estimated intensive margin elasticity. To shed light on
this matter, I perform Monte Carlo simulations generating data from a utility function with a fixed cost
of labor force participation. This allows me to investigate how extensive margin responses affect the
estimated elasticity in the bunching setting.
My main empirical findings can be summarized by the following conclusions. First, I find large
and sharp bunching in recipients’ earnings around each kink. If DI benefits were not reduced above
the threshold, recipients who bunch at the baseline kink at $4,937 would have earned $944 or about 19
percent more. This response corresponds to an earnings elasticity with respect to the implicit net-of-tax
rate of about 0.18. This elasticity is higher than estimates found in studies that examine bunching at
kinks in the income tax schedule, but is in line with estimates found in studies that examine bunching in
social security programs.5 Second, I find that the benefit offset creates sizable responses at the extensive
margin. Labor force participation is about 0.8 percentage points higher among recipients with a kink
at $8,000 which is sizable considering that only about 11 percent of DI recipients participate in the
labor force. The response corresponds to an elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to
participation taxes of about 0.11, and is in line with estimates found in other studies.6. Third, I find that
extensive margin responses induce a large bias in the bunching elasticity in my setting. The Monte Carlo
simulations reveal that the bias amounts to about 70 percent of the true elasticity. However, I show that
the bias is negligible if one accounts for extensive margin responses in earnings distributions. Fourth,
my findings indicate that relaxing the benefit offset increases disposable income and reduces costs for
current recipients of the program. However, overall costs for the government are likely to increase if a
more lenient benefit offset policy attracts more individuals to the DI program.
A caveat with this study is that it is not informative about the level of increased program inflow
when recipients are allowed to keep a larger share of their benefits as they earn more. Because recipients
were unable to manipulate the DI award date, and the more lenient benefit schedule was a transitional
policy, I am unable to identify this effect. I do, however, calculate the size of induced entry that has to be
generated by more generous benefit schedules in order to increase program costs. Based on findings in
3In particular, I estimate the bunching elasticity using the polynomial approach of Chetty et al. (2011) and the linear
approximation approach suggested by Saez (2010).
4See e.g. Gelber et al. (2017b, 2020a).
5Saez (2010); Chetty et al. (2011); Bastani & Selin (2014); Paetzold (2019) find elasticities in the range of 0-0.05 among
wage earners. Zaresani (2020) and Ruh & Staubli (2019) estimate structural earnings elasticities of 0.20 and 0.27 using a kink
in the Canadian DI program and a notch in Austrian DI program, respectively. Gelber et al., 2020b find an observed elasticity
of 0.19 in the US social security program.
6Kostøl & Mogstad (2014) estimate an elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to participation taxes of about
0.12 in the Norwegian DI program. Ruh & Staubli (2019) find an elasticity of about 0.10 in the Austrian DI program.
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previous studies, I find that relaxing the benefit offset is likely to increase overall public expenditures.7
My paper primarily contributes to a small and inconclusive literature that assesses fiscal costs of the
benefit schedule in DI programs. Kostøl & Mogstad (2014) find that replacing a notch at the exemption
threshold with a kink in the Norwegian DI program was likely to reduce program costs. In contrast, Ruh
& Staubli (2019) exploit a notch in the Austrian DI program, and conclude that abolishing the notch
would increase program costs.8 They find that most of the increased government revenue comes from
extensive margin responses if the benefit schedule is relaxed. I contribute to this literature by assessing
policy implications in a DI policy where recipients are subject to kinked incentives.
My paper is also closely related to the broader literature that examines labor supply effects of finan-
cial incentives to work for DI recipients. Zaresani (2020) estimates a structural earnings elasticity of
0.20 using kinks in the Canadian DI program. Weathers & Hemmeter (2011) examine effects of a pilot
project that replaced a notch at the exemption threshold with a gradual reduction in DI benefits in the US.
They find that the policy change significantly increased the number of recipients with earnings above the
exemption threshold. Campolieti & Riddell (2012) find that the introduction of an exemption threshold
significantly increased labor force participation of Canadian DI beneficiaries. They find no changes in
program inflow or outflow. In contrast to the above studies, Schimmel et al. (2011) find that increasing
the exemption threshold from $500 to $700 in the US only increased beneficiaries’ earnings by a small
amount. Butler et al. (2015) investigate employment effects of a conditional cash program that offered
cash claims for DI recipients who expanded work in a randomized experiment. They only find small
and negligible effects on employment. I contribute to this literature by identifying intensive margin and
extensive margin responses separately. My paper is also related to the literature on the potential work
capacity of DI recipients.9
Finally, my paper also relates to a large literature that studies behavioral responses to kinked incen-
tives. In particular, Saez (2010) shows that bunching at kinks can identify a behavioral elasticity. Chetty
et al. (2011) extend this framework to allow for adjustment costs. More recently, Blomquist et al. (2019)
show how an elasticity can be identified from variation in budget sets. I contribute to this literature by
implementing the conceptual framework of Blomquist et al. (2019) and estimate the bunching elasticity
non-parametrically. In terms of understanding how standard empirical implementations of the bunching
approach perform, I contribute by investigating how these approaches compare to the non-parametric
approach. My findings indicate that common estimation approaches in the literature perform well in
my context.10 My paper is also related to several studies using bunching at kinks to identify earnings
responses in social security programs (e.g. Le Barbanchon, 2016; Gelber et al., 2020b; Zaresani, 2020).
The bunching approach has also been used to identify responses in many other contexts.11 Kleven (2016)
provides a review of this literature.
7See e.g. Hoynes & Moffitt (1999); Gruber (2000); Campolieti & Riddell (2012); Mullen & Staubli (2016); Castello (2017).
8Ruh & Staubli (2019) estimate a structural elasticity driving the responses of about 0.27.
9A number of studies document that DI receipt significantly reduces earnings and labor force participation by using rejected
applicants as a control group for DI recipients (e.g. Bound, 1989; Chen & van der Klaauw, 2008; Singleton, 2012; Maestas
et al., 2013; French & Song, 2014). There is also some evidence on the work capacity for DI recipients who have endured
longer spells on DI (Borghans et al., 2014; Moore, 2015).
10Specifically, fitting a flexible polynomial to the empirical distribution following Chetty et al. (2011) yields an elasticity
of about 0.15-0.19 depending on the polynomial order, while the non-parametric approach yields an elasticity of about 0.18.
Using the approach of Saez (2010), I estimate an elasticity of about 0.19.
11Some examples include Einav et al. (2017) who use a dynamic model to investigate responses to health insurance contracts,
retirement decisions (Manoli & Weber, 2016), effects of minimum wages (Harasztosi & Lindner, 2019), transaction taxes in
housing markets (Kopczuk & Munroe, 2015; Best & Kleven, 2017) and responses to speed controls (Traxler et al., 2018).
4
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the Norwegian DI program
and the incentives to work. Section 3 describes the data and sample used in the empirical analysis.
Section 4 outlines the methodology and the validity of the empirical design. Section 5 presents the main
results of the estimated earnings elasticity. Section 6 analyzes the extensive margin responses. Section
7 performs an analysis of the elasticity using common bunching methods in the literature. Section 8
calculates fiscal effects of alternative policies and discusses their implications. Section 9 concludes.
2 Institutional Background
2.1 The Norwegian DI Program
The Norwegian DI program is designed to provide partial earnings replacement to working-age indi-
viduals whose work capacity is permanently reduced due to a medically verifiable physical or mental
impairment. The program is part of the broader social security system and is financed by payroll taxes.
Of the OECD countries, Norway has one of the highest proportions of the working age population on
DI rolls. From 1961 to 2004, the percentage of the working age population on DI rolls increased consis-
tently from 2.2 to 10.4 percent. Since 2004, the proportion decreased slightly and is around 9.5 percent
as of 2016, with public spending around $10 billion, or 3 percent of GDP (NAV, 2018).
Pathways into DI and Determination Process In order to apply for DI benefits, individuals’ ability
to work must have been clarified by a primary medical doctor and appropriate vocational measures
must have been completed. Only individuals in the working age population 18-67 years are eligible
to apply. Individuals’ ability to work must be permanently reduced by at least 50 percent, and illness
or injury must be the main reason for the reduced work capacity.12 In Norway, most applicants for
permanent DI benefits are beneficiaries of a temporary DI program whose purpose is to evaluate and
improve beneficiaries’ ability to work. More than 80 percent of allowed cases for permanent DI benefits
are individuals who have endured spells on this program. The temporary DI program in its current form
was implemented in March 2010 when three different types of temporary DI or rehabilitation programs
were replaced by the current program. As a general rule, temporary DI benefits are provided for up to 4
years for eligible individuals during the time period I consider in this paper.13 Other pathways into DI
include individuals on sickness benefits while some clear cut cases lead directly to award.
If the criteria for permanent disability are met, individuals must submit an application to the Norwe-
gian Labor and Welfare Administration (NAV) whose disability examiners and medical doctors assess
the medical evidence and verify the validity of the claim.14 Processing an application usually takes be-
tween 4-9 months depending on the complexity of the application, workload and geographical location
of the local DI office. If the disability examiner concludes that the applicant cannot engage in more
than 50 percent of full-time employment because of the health impairment, and appropriate vocational
measures have been completed, a disability award is made. Approximately 85 percent of applications
are accepted. Of allowed cases, about 80 percent are allowed a full disability claim.15
12For individuals on the temporary DI program at the time of application, a 40 percent permanent reduction in earnings
capacity is sufficient. For individuals whose disability is due to an approved occupational illness or injury, a 30 percent
permanent reduction in earnings capacity is sufficient.
13From 2018, benefits are provided for up to 3 years as a general rule.
14Dahl et al. (2014) explain the disability determination process in detail.
15The remaining 20 percent of allowed DI cases are allowed a partial DI claim where disability rating depends on the
perceived ability to work. I abstract from partially disabled recipients in this paper.
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2.2 Benefit Phase-out and Levels
DI recipients deemed as totally disabled in Norway can earn up to an exemption threshold K each year
without any reductions in DI benefits B.16 If annual earnings z exceed this threshold, DI benefits are
gradually reduced by a share τ for every dollar in earnings above the threshold. The relationship can be





B0 i f z ≤ K
B0 − τ(z−K) i f z > K
(1)
where the implicit tax-rate τ is equal to the replacement rate of DI benefits which is approximately
66 percent for most recipients. Specifically, τ = B0/y0 where y0 is pre-disability earnings adjusted for
wage growth.17 Both earnings and DI benefits are subject to regular income taxes. The general annual
exemption threshold is $4,937 in 2016 dollars and is indexed annually according to the average wage
growth. This is equivalent to about 4 hours of work per week for the representative DI recipient. Until
2018, a transitional policy applied to recipients awarded DI before 1st of January 2015 who were subject
Figure 1: Budget Sets
Notes: The figure shows the budget set for recipients awarded DI before and after 1.1.2015, respectively, during years 2015-2018. For
illustrative purposes and with minimal loss of generality, I assume that recipients awarded DI before and after 1.1.2015 receive the same
amount of (uncapped) DI benefits, and disregard dependent benefits and income taxation.
16Partially disabled recipients are subject to the same benefit phase-out rules as totally disabled, but with an individual
exemption threshold Ki which depends on disability rating and past earnings.
17Pre-disability earnings are defined as each individual’s earnings potential if engaged in full-time employment prior to
disability onset. For recipients with little or no earnings history, pre-disability earnings are set to minimum levels. If annual
earnings exceed 80 percent of pre-disability earnings, recipients are considered engaging in full-time employment and no
benefits are provided for that year. DI recipients can exceed this threshold for up to five consecutive years and keep their DI
receipt.
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to a relaxed threshold of $8,000, or about 6 hours of work per week.18 Figure 1 represents the budget
constraints for the two groups.
Benefit Levels DI benefits replace about 66 percent of past earnings up to a maximum amount of about
$49,000 per annum. If recipients have little or no earnings history, they receive a minimum amount of
DI benefits of about $31,000.19 In 2015, the definition of past earnings which calculations of DI benefits
is based upon was changed. For recipients awarded DI before 1st of January 2015, benefits were based
on projected retirement savings as if the individual had continued to work until the general retirement
age of 67 years. The years with the lowest income, or projected income in the future were excluded
so that a maximum of 20 years of earnings history were used in the calculations of DI benefits. For
recipients awarded DI on 1st of January 2015 or later, DI benefits were calculated using the highest
average income in three of the last five years prior to disability onset. Because DI benefits were based
on more recent earnings history, this group of recipients receive slightly higher (uncapped) DI benefits
on average due to real wage growth, approximately 4% more on average. Minimum benefits were the
same independently of award date.
3 Data and Sample Selection
This section describes the administrative data sources, key outcome variables and the main sample for
the empirical analysis.
3.1 Data Sources
In the empirical analysis, I use data from three main sources that can be linked by unique and anonymized
identifiers for every resident individual. The data on DI recipients is provided by the Norwegian Labor
and Welfare Administration (NAV) and contains monthly records of all DI recipients who entered the
permanent DI program until 31st of December 2015. It contains information about the level of DI bene-
fits received, disability rating, month of DI award, month of disability onset, pre-disability earnings and
a rich set of demographic and socioeconomic information including gender, age and cohabitant status.
The earnings data is also provided by NAV and contains monthly records of wage earnings for each
employer-employee relationship during years 2015-2017. Finally, I use administrative data provided
by Statistics Norway which contains individual demographic and socio-economic information such as
education, number of children and date of death.
The administrative nature of the data reduces the extent of measurement errors in disability variables
and employment relationships. Because individual disability status and earnings are third-party reported
(i.e. by NAV and the employers), the coverage and reliability are rated as exceptional by international
quality assessments (see e.g. Atkinson et al., 1995). Since administrative data are a matter of public
record, there is no attrition due to non-response or non-consent by individuals or firms, and individuals
can only exit these data sets due to natural attrition (i.e. death or out-migration).
18Before 2015, the exemption threshold was approximately $12,000 and recipients were subject to a different set of work
incentives. The exemption threshold at $8,000 was therefore a transitional policy from the previous work incentives until 2018.
From 2019 and onward, all recipients are subject to a common threshold of $4,937.
19For cohabitant recipients, minimum benefits amounts to about $28,000. In addition, recipients classed as “young disabled”
get an additional amount of about $5,000 if they were 26 years or younger at disability onset.
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3.2 Variables
Because phase-out of DI benefits is determined at the annual level, the main outcome variable I consider
is annual wage earnings.20 As the earnings data comes from monthly records, I construct this variable
by summarizing earnings from all employer-employee relationships (if more than one) for each month
during the calendar year. The second key outcome variable I consider is whether recipients have any an-
nual earnings. In Norway, employees are subject to holiday pay which is based on last year’s earnings.21
In order to distinguish between recipients who have engaged in employment and those whose earnings
are based on last year’s earnings, I therefore define this variable as positive earnings excluding holiday
pay. The time period I consider is 2016-2017 as some recipients in the estimation sample were awarded
DI in 2015, and 2017 is the last year of the data.
3.3 Estimation Sample
The main sample used in the empirical analysis consists of recipients awarded DI between 1st of April
2014 and 30th of September 2015, i.e. +/- 9 months around the cut-off date for being subject to the
relaxed benefit phase-out. I restrict the sample to recipients who are deemed totally disabled by NAV
due to a lack of information on the exact location of the exemption threshold among partially disabled
recipients. Furthermore, I exclude recipients who turn 67 years during the calendar year due to eligibility
for old-age pension beginning at age 67.
Table 1 reports summary statistics for all totally disabled DI recipients awarded DI before 2015 as
well as the estimation sample of recipients with DI award on each side of the cut-off date, respectively.
Compared to the average DI recipient, recipients in the estimation sample have lower earnings and
fewer recipients have any labor market earnings. By construction, they have also spent fewer years on
DI and are somewhat younger. Otherwise, individual characteristics are fairly similar. As for the two
groups in the estimation sample, recipients awarded DI in 2015 receive about 5 percent more (uncapped)
DI benefits compared to recipients awarded DI in 2014. While the two groups share fairly similar
characteristics, there is in particular one notable difference. Recipients awarded DI in 2014 are far more
likely to have been on a prior temporary DI program before the current temporary DI program was
implemented in March 2010. As the general maximum spell on the current temporary DI program is 4
years, many recipients who were transferred from the prior programs were awarded DI in 2014. As a
result, these individuals are slightly younger and have endured longer spells since disability onset before
being awarded DI on average.
20While income from self-employment is also subject to a reduction in DI benefits, very few DI recipients have income from
self-employment (less than 1 percent of recipients with some earnings).
21As a general rule, employees get 12 percent of last year’s earnings as holiday pay in June the following year regardless of
current employer-employee relationship(s).
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
All DI recipients Estimation sample
DI award: - dec 2014 apr-dec 2014 jan-sep 2015
Kink point: $8,000 $8,000 $4,937
Outcome variables: mean sd mean sd mean sd
Annual earnings ($) 993 (4,309) 627 (3,229) 463 (2,450)
Any annual earnings (%) 15.6 12.1 11.0
DI Information:
Uncapped DI benefits ($) 35,566 (6,258) 34,485 (6,570) 36,207 (8,193)
Pre-disability earnings ($) 57,334 (15,197) 59,410 (15,233) 60,224 (16,395)
Benefit replacement rate .62 (.09) .59 (.10) .61 (.11)
DI award date 2003 (11) 2014 (0) 2015 (0)
Disability onset date 1999 (9) 2007 (4) 2009 (4)
Fraction from TDI program .41 .92 .89
Fraction from prior TDI programs .27 .57 .30
Individual characteristics:
Age 52.3 (11.0) 47.6 (12.1) 48.0 (13.1)
Age at DI award 40.3 (13.8) 46.3 (12.1) 47.4 (13.1)
Years of schooling 10.7 (2.1) 10.9 (2.2) 11.0 (2.2)
Number of children 1.6 (1.4) 1.7 (1.4) 1.6 (1.4)
Fraction females .56 .56 .54
Fraction cohabitants .48 .51 .51
Number of recipients 236,568 16,620 13,697
Notes: All samples consist of totally disabled DI recipients with DI receipt 31.12.2015. Outcome variables are measured in 2016 and 2017.
Age, years of schooling, cohabitant status and number of children are measured in 2015. All other covariates are either pre-determined or
constant over time. Earnings and DI benefits are measured in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD = 7.5).
Next, I examine the earnings distributions for each group in the estimation sample around the annual
kinks. Figure 2 shows the raw earnings distributions for each group in 2016 and 2017 grouped into $400
bins. Specifically, the black solid line indicates the density for recipients awarded DI between January
and September 2015, and the vertical red solid line indicates the kink point for these recipients at $4,937.
The gray solid line indicates the density for recipients awarded DI between April and December 2014,
with the vertical red dashed line indicating the kink point for this group at $8,000. I use the full sample of
recipients (i.e. including recipients with zero earnings) to calculate the density for each group. Notably,
there is large bunching around each kink. Otherwise, the densities appear to track each other very closely
in regions outside of the two kinks. The similarities in densities below the first kink point is particularly
striking, indicating that the earnings potential between the two groups is similar.
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Notes: Panel (a) and (b) show the earnings distributions in $400 bins for DI recipients awarded DI between April 1st and December 31st 2014
(gray line) and recipients awarded DI between January 1st and September 30th 2015 (black line) in 2016 and 2017. The red dashed line and the
red solid line indicate the kink point in the budget constraint for each group, respectively. Earnings are measured in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD
= 7.5).
4 Methodology
This section outlines the conceptual framework for my empirical strategy. In the empirical application,
my goal is to estimate the earnings elasticity with respect to the implicit tax rate implied by the phase-out
of DI benefits. Identification of the elasticity relies on the fact that DI recipients are subject to different
budget sets depending on award date.
4.1 Theoretical Framework
My framework follows Blomquist et al. (2019) but focus on the kink in the consumption-leisure space
for DI recipients as opposed to a kink in the income tax schedule. I assume that recipients maximize the










subject to the budget constraint c = B+ z−T (z;B) where c is consumption, B is DI benefits and z is
before-tax earnings. T (z;B) is the implicit tax liability, and depends on earnings and DI benefits. n is an
ability parameter and e is the earnings elasticity with respect to the marginal net-of-tax rate 1− t. A key
identifying assumption is that the distribution of ability n is smooth in the population. This assumption
implies that, given a linear tax system T (z;B) = t · (z+B), the smooth ability distribution translates into
a smooth after-tax earnings distribution. Maximization of U(c,z) subject to the linear budget constraint
yields z = n(1− t)e. Note that z = n if t = 0, i.e. n can be interpreted as potential earnings if there were
no implicit taxes on earnings. Because of the quasi-linearity assumption, the model rules out income
effects of tax changes on earnings.22
22If income effects are present, the estimated elasticity will be downward biased as the income effect induces individuals to
work more (assuming leisure is a normal good). Hence, the compensated elasticity (accounting only for substitution effects)
will be larger than the uncompensated elasticity (accounting for income and substitution effects). However, Bastani & Selin
(2014) show that even large income effects induced by a kink in the budget set have little impact on the compensated elasticity.
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Now, suppose that a kink is introduced at some threshold z∗, with the tax rate increasing from t to
t +∆t. The tax schedule can now be expressed as T (z;B) = t · (z+B)+∆ t · (z− z∗) ·1(z ≥ z∗). Figure
3 (a) and (b) illustrate how the slope in the budget set changes at z∗. Individual H is the individual with
the highest earnings before the kink is introduced who would locate at z∗ with the kink, illustrated by
the slope in the indifference curve H ′ being exactly equal to the slope in the budget set above the kink
1− t −△t. This is the marginal bunching individual. The individual would locate at z∗+△z before the
kink is introduced and locate at z∗ with the kink in the budget set. Individual L would locate at z∗ in both
cases. Individuals with earnings in the interval [z∗,z∗+△z] before the kink is introduced would locate
at z∗ with the kink. This is illustrated in Figure 3 (c) which shows the probability density distributions
pre- and post the introduction of the kink. The earnings distribution is smooth in the population before
Figure 3: Budget Set and Density Distributions
(a) Budget set (b) Budget set
(c) Probability distributions (d) Cumulative distributions
Notes: Panel (a) and (b) show after-tax income as a function of annual earnings with a linear tax t (dashed line) and with the tax increasing
from t to t +△t at the kink point z∗ (solid line). z∗ +∆z denotes the earnings of the marginal buncher, i.e. the individual with the highest
earnings without the implicit tax on DI benefits who will locate at z∗ with the implicit tax on DI benefits above z∗ . Panel (c) shows the
probability density distribution with and without the kink at z∗. Panel (d) shows the corresponding cumulative distributions.
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the kink is introduced, while there is substantial bunching at the kink after the kink is introduced. Figure
3 (d) shows the corresponding cumulative distributions. Because the pre-kink earnings distribution is
smooth in the population, the point in the pre-kink CDF at z∗ +△z corresponds to the point in the
post-kink CDF of the marginal bunching individual who is now locating at z∗. This is illustrated by the
horizontal dashed line.
Next, consider two groups j = 1,2 drawn from the same distribution of ability n. Group 1 is subject
a constant marginal tax rate t for the whole budget set, while for group 2 the marginal tax rate increases
from t to t +∆t at z∗. Let F1(Z) and F2(Z) be the corresponding cumulative distribution functions for








where e is the earnings elasticity with respect to the net-of-tax rate t, and ∆z is the earnings response
of the marginal bunching individual defined as the point where F1(z∗+∆z) = F2(z∗).23 Intuitively, this
corresponds to the same point in the CDF between the two groups at the kink point for group 2 where
the marginal tax rate differs between the two groups. Because the distribution of ability is smooth,
each point in the CDFs of the two groups corresponds to individuals with the same ability, or potential
earnings.
4.2 Empirical Implementation
My approach to estimate the earnings elasticity e relies on the fact that two groups of DI recipients in the
estimation sample are subject to different budget sets. In particular, the kink point for recipients awarded
DI in 2015 is z∗ = $4,937 where the marginal tax rate on earnings increases from t0 to t1. Here, t0 is the
regular marginal tax rate on income and t1 = t0 + τ(1− t0), where τ is the benefit phase-out rate.24 At
the same point in the budget set, the marginal tax rate is t0 for recipients awarded DI before 2015. Using







where ∆ẑ is the estimated response of the marginal buncher, and is given by F̂0(z∗ + ∆ẑ) = F̂1(z∗),
where Fi(Z) is the cumulative distribution function of DI recipients with treatment status i = 0,1 where
treatment status i = 0 indicates recipients awarded DI before 2015 and i = 1 indicates recipients awarded
DI in 2015 or later. Intuitively, the estimated earnings response of the marginal buncher, or the last
individual with earnings at the kink z∗ = $4,937 in the treated group corresponds to the individual at the
same point in the CDF in the non-treated group. The crucial assumption in my setting is that potential
earnings, i.e. earnings without the phase-out of DI benefits for individuals with DI award on either side of
the cut-off date are drawn from the same distribution, and that this distribution is smooth. Additionally,
I assume that the earnings distribution of recipients awarded DI before 2015 is unaffected by the kink
at $8,000 in the interval [0,z∗+∆z], i.e. recipients who would locate above this region without the kink
would not locate in this region with the kink.
23A formal proof of this result is provided in Blomquist et al. (2019).
24For most recipients, the marginal tax rate on income t0 is about 35 percent. At the kink, the marginal tax rate therefore
increases from about 35 percent to about .35 + .66·(1-.35) = 78 percent.
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Inference To calculate the standard error of the estimated elasticity, I use bootstrap methods. First,
I generate many earnings distributions by random resampling with replacement. As the estimation
sample may include the same individuals more than once, I use a pairs-cluster bootstrap that accounts
for clustering at the individual level, keeping all observations of each individual that I resample. Second,
I re-estimate the elasticity within each sample, and define the standard error as the standard deviation of
the distribution of the elasticity. In all estimations, I use 500 repetitions.
4.3 Threats to Identification
The validity of my empirical design hinges on the assumption that recipients with DI award on either
side of the cut-off at 1st of January 2015 are drawn from the same distribution of potential earnings.
In other words, the earnings distributions should be comparable if these recipients were subject to the
same benefit phase-out policy. The validity of my design therefore requires that recipients are unable to
precisely manipulate the DI award date. Crucially, there were no changes to eligibility for DI around
the cut-off date. Although some institutional details were formalized as early as 2011, the policy change
was announced as late as October 2014. Because processing times of applications usually take between
4-9 months, recipients were unable to gain entry before the cut-off date of January 1st, 2015. Even if
potential applicants would have some influence over when to apply for DI, recipients would be unable
to manipulate the award date precisely because of uncertainty in the processing time of applications.
Therefore, the variation in treatment should be randomized close to the cut-off.25
Figure 4 shows the distribution of DI award date around the cut-off. Because I only have monthly
data on DI award, the assignment variable in this context is discrete. I therefore follow Frandsen (2017)
and perform a formal statistical test for bunching on either side of the cut-off. While this test rejects the
null hypothesis of no bunching, the test also rejects the null in more than half of hypothetical placebo
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Notes: The figure shows the distribution of DI award between January 2014 and December 2015. The sample consists of totally disabled
recipients on DI receipt 31.12.2015 aged 18-66 years.
25See Lee & Lemieux (2010).
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cut-off points during the time period considered in the empirical analysis.26 This suggests a natural
high variation in the number of allowed applications may explain why the test of no bunching fails in
this context rather than manipulation of the DI award date.
While recipients awarded DI before the cut-off date were subject to a more lenient benefit phase-
out, the policy was announced as a transitional policy which would revert to a common policy in 2019.
Therefore, the gain from being subject to the more lenient benefit phase-out was limited. If one would
worry about potential manipulation of the DI award date, a bigger concern is the fact that calculation
of DI benefits was also changed at the cut-off date. Because DI benefits were calculated using more
recent years of earnings history for awards after 1st of January 2015, most recipients would receive
slightly higher levels of DI benefits if awarded DI after this date due to real wage growth. While this
would require detailed information about earnings history and institutional details among recipients, I
cannot rule out this possibility. In order to shed light on this concern, I calculate the DI benefits that
recipients hypothetically would receive if awarded DI after the cut-off date.27 If DI recipients were able
to manipulate the award date, one would expect recipients with high potential DI benefits post the cut-off
date to locate to the right of the cut-off, and vice versa for recipients with low potential DI benefits who
would locate before the cut-off date. As a formal test, I run a regression of projected DI benefits (if
recipients were awarded DI after the cut-off date) on a dummy which equal to 1 if the observed award
date is after the cut-off date using 2 months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off and a triangular
kernel. Reassuringly, the coefficient on the dummy is highly insignificant with a p-value of 0.47, lending
support to the claim that recipients were unable to manipulate the DI award date to get maximum DI
benefits.
To shed further light on possible manipulation of the DI award date, I extend the above exercise
to include a rich set of individual characteristics. If recipients indeed were unable to manipulate the
DI award date, any pre-determined covariate should have the same distribution on each side, close to
the cut-off. In Appendix Table A.1, I report coefficients and standard errors of each pre-determined
covariate running the same regression as described above. While most covariates appear smooth around
the cut-off and are insignificant at conventional levels, one exception is years of education which is
significant at the 1% level. However, based on the large number of covariates I consider, the probability
of observing changes in one covariate around the cut-off is quite large. If I perform a joint test for all
covariates, I cannot reject the null of no manipulation at conventional levels of significance as reported
in Appendix Table A.1. The p-value of the joint test is 0.18.28
Income Effects and Weighting Strategy As recipients awarded DI before the cut-off date receive
a slightly lower DI benefit, this might induce this group of recipients to work more than recipients
awarded DI after the cut-off date through an income effect.29 In that case, this would shift the pre-kink
CDF in Figure 3 (d) to the right and bias the elasticity upwards. Ideally, one would want to identify the
26The test rejects 12 out of the 22 placebo cut-off points between each pair of months of DI award between January 2014
and December 2015.
27Unfortunately, I am unable to calculate DI benefits using the definition before 2015 due to data limitations.
28Using the sample with only 1 month of bandwidth on each side yields the same conclusions for each covariate separately
as well as jointly, with the p-value of the joint test being 0.13.
29Several studies have shown that increasing (reducing) the generosity of DI benefits reduces (increases) beneficiaries labor
supply through an income effect. See e.g. Gruber, 2000; Marie & Castello, 2012; Gelber et al., 2017a; Deuchert & Eugster,
2019.
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income and substitution effects separately. Unfortunately, separating the two effects is not possible in
this context as I only have one instrument that is the DI award date. In order to address the issue of DI
benefits not being directly comparable between the two groups, I apply the weighting approach proposed
by Kline (2011).30 This approach accounts for differences in pre-determined covariates between the two
groups, and in particular the level of DI benefits. Intuitively, recipients awarded DI before the cut-off
with high DI benefits are assigned a higher relative weight in estimations. While the approach does not
fully account for the difference in DI benefits between the two groups, it reduces the difference from
about 4% to 1%. In Section 5, I show that the bias in the compensated elasticity is small if income
effects induces recipients to work more due to a lower DI benefit.
Another advantage of the weighting approach is that it accounts for differences in (other) pre-
determined covariates between the two samples, including years of education which was significant
in the balancing tests. While my estimation sample ideally would only include observations very close
to the cut-off, deciding the bandwidth, i.e. the sample of DI recipients on each side of the cut-off date
is a trade-off between bias and variance. As one includes observations further away from the cut-off,
differences in pre-determined covariates increase. In particular, a larger share of recipients awarded DI
early in 2014 had endured spells on a prior temporary DI program before being awarded DI. These re-
cipients were slightly younger and had endured longer spells between DI award and disability onset, and
could therefore have slightly different earnings potential than other recipients if i.e. health improves or
worsens over time.31 The weighting approach assigns lower weights to these recipients as they are less
likely to be awarded DI after the cut-off date. Appendix Table A.2 shows that the difference between the
two groups in the estimation sample is insignificant at all conventional levels when using the weighting
approach. This result holds for all covariates separately as well as jointly. The p-value of the joint test is
0.43.
As the goal of my main estimation strategy is not to identify average effects of the different incentives
to work, it is not entirely clear how to decide the bandwidth in this context. In my baseline specification,
I use 9 months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off which is the optimal bandwidth suggested by
Calonico et al. (2014).32 A potential worry using observations further away from the cut-off is trends in
earnings potential if i.e. health improves or worsens over time. Because of this, I use triangular weights
in my baseline specifications. To examine the validity of my findings, I perform several robustness
checks. In particular, I show that the estimated earnings elasticity is relatively robust to bandwidth
selection. I also show that average effects are practically indistinguishable if I include linear or quadratic
trends in the DI award date in a standard regression discontinuity design.
30I implement this adjustment by estimating the probability of each recipients being awarded DI after the cut-off date
P(Ii = 1|xi) using a logistic regression. As the level of DI benefits may be correlated with other covariates such as age, education
and pre-DI earnings, only re-weighting the level of DI benefits might induce imbalance in covariates that are correlated with
DI benefits between the two samples. Therefore, I include the full set of covariates included in Table A.2 along with uncapped






where P(I = 1) denotes the probability of being awarded DI after the cut-off date.
31As a robustness check, I exclude recipients who have endured spells on a prior DI program. As opposed to the full
(unweighted) sample of DI recipients, this alternative sample is balanced in terms of pre-determined covariates as reported in
Appendix Table A.1. Although less precise, the estimated elasticity is practically indistinguishable from the estimated elasticity
using the full sample with the weighting approach.
32The optimal bandwidth is calculated using the weighted sample and a triangular kernel with no (linear) trends in the
assignment variable.
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Extensive Margin Responses While my baseline model does not incorporate responses at the ex-
tensive margin, it is possible that the lower kink induces some individuals to stop working altogether.
Theoretically, a higher average tax on earnings will induce some individuals to stop working if individ-
uals have a fixed cost of labor force participation. In Section 6, I document that the fraction of recipients
with some earnings is lower among recipients with the kink at $4,937 compared to recipients with the
kink at $8,000. I also show that the elasticity is substantially upward biased if I do not account for
extensive margin responses by calibrating a model with a fixed cost of labor force participation to the
empirical distribution. Intuitively, the recipients who stop working would have earned above the kink
under the more lenient benefit phase-out policy. Because of this, there would be missing mass in the
upper part of the earnings distribution which would shift the post-kink CDF in Figure 3 (d) to the left.
If one does not account for this response, the response of the marginal bunching individual will be over-
stated and the estimated elasticity upward biased. In order to adjust for extensive margin responses, I
follow Ruh & Staubli (2019) and assume that the distribution of recipients who stop working is the same
as the observed earnings distribution above the kink.33 In Section 6, I show that the estimated elasticity
is very close to the theoretical elasticity when incorporating this adjustment procedure in a simulation
exercise.
5 Main Results
This section presents the main results and begins with a graphical representation of the estimation strat-
egy. I then proceed by presenting the main analytical results before challenging the empirical specifica-
tion in several ways.
5.1 Graphical Evidence of Behavioral Responses
I begin my analysis by providing a graphical representation of the estimation procedure. Figure 5 (a)
shows the weighted earnings distributions for the pooled sample of recipients with some earnings for
each group in the estimation sample grouped into $400 bins. First, recipients are weighted by a triangular
weight so that recipients close to the cut-off are assigned higher relative weights. Second, recipients
awarded DI before the cut-off are weighted by propensity score weights that accounts for differences in
pre-determined covariates between the two groups, and in particular the level of uncapped DI benefits.
Third, I incorporate the adjustment procedure for extensive margin responses outlined in Section 4 by
adding recipients awarded DI after the cut-off to the right of the kink until the fraction of recipients
with some earnings is the same between the two groups. Responses should therefore be interpreted as
intensive margin responses to the implicit tax on earnings as DI benefits are phased out above the kink.
33Specifically, I add individuals to the right of the kink for recipients subject to the lower exemption threshold until the
fraction of working individuals is the same for both groups.
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Figure 5: Graphical Representation of Earnings Elasticity Estimation: Pooled Sample
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the (weighted) pooled earnings distributions for 2016 and 2017 in $400 bins for recipients with positive earnings
awarded DI between April 1st and December 31st 2014 (gray line) and recipients awarded DI between January 1st and September 30th 2015
(black line). The red dashed line and the red solid line indicate the kink point in the budget constraint for each group, respectively. Both
groups are weighted by a triangular kernel weight in estimations. For recipients awarded DI in 2015, I add recipients to the right of the kink
until the fraction of recipients with positive earnings is the same as for recipients awarded DI in 2014 in order to adjust for extensive margin





where P(I = 1) denotes the
probability of being awarded DI in 2015 and P(Ii = 1|xi) is estimated with a logit model using the covariates in Table A.2 (including uncapped
DI benefits) as control variables. Panel (b) shows the corresponding cumulative distributions. The horizontal dashed line indicates the CDF at
the kink for recipients awarded DI in 2015. The vertical gray dashed line indicates earnings of the marginal buncher z∗+△z. Standard errors
are calculated by a pairs cluster bootstrap which accounts for clustering at the individual level using 500 replications. Earnings are measured
in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD = 7.5).
Figure 5 (b) shows the corresponding cumulative earnings distributions for each group. The distribu-
tions appear to track each other very closely until about $3,000 from which the cumulative distribution
for recipients with DI award after the cut-off increases more steeply due to recipients bunching around
the kink at $4,937 (indicated by the red solid line). The same pattern is observed for recipients with DI
award before the cut-off who bunch around the kink at $8,000 (indicated by the red dashed line). Re-
assuringly, the cumulative distributions appear to track each other very closely above the second kink,
indicating that the distributions would have been comparable if the two groups were subject to the same
benefit phase-out policy. The horizontal dashed line indicates the point in the CDF for the last individ-
ual who bunches at the kink at $4,937 for the sample of recipients awarded DI after the cut-off. The
vertical dashed line indicates the earnings of the individual at the same point in the CDF for the sample
of recipients with DI award before the cut-off. This is the estimated earnings of the marginal bunching
individual. Then, I plug this estimate into the formula for the elasticity given by Equation 4 and estimate
an earnings elasticity of about 0.18.
5.2 Earnings Elasticity Estimates
In this section, I present the main estimation results. Table 2 reports estimates of the earnings elasticity
(e), the earnings response of the marginal buncher (∆z) and the average intensive margin response for the
main estimation sample. I present estimates using the weighting approach that accounts for differences
in pre-determined covariates between the two groups and unweighted estimates for comparison. Both
specifications use triangular weights and incorporates the adjustment procedure for extensive margin
responses outlined in Section 4.
17
Table 2: Earnings Elasticities for Pooled Sample and by Year
Earnings response ($) Observations
Elasticity (e) Marginal buncher (∆z) Average response <individuals>
Full sample .177*** .198*** 944** 1,067*** 157 531* 59,753
(2016-2017) (.066) (.059) (392) (357) (308) (307) <30,317>
By year:
2016 .132** .172*** 689* 914*** 151 455 30,317
(.067) (.058) (368) (341) (322) (316)
2017 .217*** .218*** 1,186*** 1,192*** 163 532 29,436
(.064) (.063) (401) (392) (396) (410)
Weighted Yes No Yes No Yes No
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Notes: The table reports intensive margin estimates of the elasticity, the earnings response of the marginal buncher defined as the earnings
response at the first kink and the average response of recipients for the full sample and by each year (2016 and 2017). The sample consist of
totally DI recipients awarded DI between 1st of April 2014 and 30th of September 2015. For recipients awarded DI in 2015, I add recipients
to the right of the kink until the fraction of recipients with positive earnings is the same as for recipients awarded DI in 2014 in order to






where P(I = 1) denotes the probability of being awarded DI in 2015 and P(Ii = 1|xi) is estimated with a logit
model using the individual characteristics in Table A.2 and uncapped DI benefits as control variables. Both groups are weighted by a triangular
kernel weight in all estimations. Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated by a pairs cluster bootstrap which accounts for clustering at
the individual level using 500 replications. Earnings are measured in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD = 7.5).
For the weighted pooled sample, the estimated earnings response for the marginal buncher is large
and statistically significant. I estimate that without the kink, the marginal bunching individual who
bunches at the kink at $4,937 would have earned $944 or about 19 percent more. This response corre-
sponds to an earnings elasticity with respect to the implicit net-of-tax rate of about 0.18. In contrast,
the average earnings response is $157 and is only 17 percent as large as the response of the marginal
buncher. This estimate can be interpreted as the average intensive margin response of increasing the kink
point from $4,937 to $8,000. The fact that this estimate is small and insignificant suggests that increas-
ing the kink point only affects recipients with earnings in a narrow region. The unweighted estimates are
slightly larger, but qualitatively similar to the weighted estimates. This suggests that differences in pre-
determined covariates, and in particular DI benefits do not change my main conclusions. Notably, the
estimated earnings response for the marginal buncher and the corresponding elasticity is larger for 2017
than for 2016. While this might be explained by responses increasing over time as recipients overcome
frictions such as changing hours worked and learn the tax schedule, the difference between the two years
is not significant at conventional levels. The average response is almost indistinguishable between the
two years.
In comparison to other studies, the estimated elasticity is significantly higher than in studies that
exploit kinks in the income tax schedule. These studies typically find elasticities in the range of 0-
0.05 among wage earners (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011; Bastani & Selin, 2014; Paetzold, 2019).
Compared to similar studies on DI beneficiaries, Ruh & Staubli (2019) and Zaresani (2020) estimate
earnings elasticities of 0.27 and 0.20 in Austria and Canada, respectively. However, both these studies
estimate a structural elasticity as opposed to my study. Although the kink in this setting is large and
salient implying that recipients are more likely to overcome adjustment costs, my estimate might be
attenuated by i.e. lumpy hours or imperfect information about the benefit phase-out. In that case, the
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estimate represents a lower bound of the long-run elasticity. Also, it is important to keep in mind that my
estimation approach relies on local moments around the kink at $4,937. Compared to other countries,
the exemption threshold in Norway is quite low.34 The earnings elasticity might differ in other countries
where the exemption threshold is higher, as this subgroup of beneficiaries have higher earnings capacity
and might also be different in other dimensions. In that case, it is likely that my estimate represents a
lower bound compared to recipients around the exemption threshold in other countries.
Heterogeneity To shed further light on my main findings, I explore heterogeneity in earnings re-
sponses to the implicit tax on earnings. Appendix Table A.3 reports the estimated earnings responses
for different subgroups in the population. Somewhat surprisingly, I am unable to detect any statistically
significant differences in effects across the different subgroups. Point estimates are slightly higher for
older recipients, and slightly higher for recipients with high (uncapped) DI benefits. However, I lack
statistical precision to draw any firm conclusions. I am unable to detect any notable differences in re-
sponses between genders, recipients with different levels of education and recipients with different levels
of earnings prior to disability onset, with point estimates being very similar across subgroups.
5.3 Robustness Analysis
In order to verify the validity of my main results, I do a series of robustness checks reported in Table 3.
The first row reports estimates using the baseline specification with triangular weights and 9 months of
bandwidth on each side of the cut-off. Next, I estimate responses using rectangular weights implying
that all recipients in my sample are assigned the same relative weight in the initial estimation procedure.
Although slightly lower, the estimated effects are well within one standard error of the baseline spec-
ification. In the third specification, I exclude recipients who had endured spells on a prior temporary
DI program as this group of recipients were more likely to be awarded DI early in 2014 (i.e. before
the cut-off). This alternative sample is well balanced in terms of pre-determined covariates as reported
in Appendix Table A.1. Using this alternative sample, estimates are remarkably similar as to the full
sample of recipients. Next, I perform a placebo test by pretending that the cut-off date for being subject
to the different phase-out policies in DI benefits was 1st of January 2014 instead of 1st of January 2015.
Reassuringly, the point estimates are small and insignificant. Appendix Figure A.1 shows the probability
distributions and cumulative distributions for each group in the placebo sample, respectively. The dis-
tributions of the two groups in the placebo sample appear remarkably similar. This lends some support
to the assumption of earnings potential being comparable for recipients with slightly different DI award
dates.
Next, I examine how the estimated earnings responses change as I deviate from the baseline band-
width selection of 9 months. While the estimated elasticity is somewhat lower if I use only 1 month of
bandwidth on each side of the cut-off, the estimated elasticity is within one standard error of my main
specification. For specifications using 2 months of bandwidth or more, the estimated earnings responses
appear stable and are very similar to my main specification which is reassuring. In Appendix Figure
A.2 (a), I show how the estimated elasticity vary with bandwidth selection by plotting point estimates
with 95 percent confidence intervals for each bandwidth between 1 and 12 months. The figure yields the
same conclusion of point estimates being relatively stable to bandwidth selection.
34In the US and the UK, the exemption thresholds are about $14,000 and $8,000, respectively.
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Table 3: Robustness Checks for Earnings Responses
Earnings response ($) Observations
Elasticity (e) Marginal buncher (∆z) Average response <individuals>
Baseline .177*** .198*** 944** 1,067*** 157 531* 59,753
specification (.066) (.059) (392) (357) (308) (307) <30,317>
Rectangular .141*** .177*** 741*** 943*** 107 559** 59,753
weights (.049) (.037) (278) (218) (241) (245) <30,317>
Alternative sample: .181** .173** 951** 907** 60 60 32,782
Not on prior TDI programs (.073) (.074) (426) (426) (350) (347) <16,762>
Placebo sample: -.026 -.043 -116 -187 115 -70 57,189
DI award 2013-2014 (.033) (.033) (142) (139) (315) (298) <29,046>
Alternative bandwidths:
1 month .117 .117 585 585 -797 -709 6,422
(.126) (.115) (655) (607) (931) (918) <3,260>
2 months .182 .182* 947 947 -151 -67 11,757
(.112) (.106) (627) (604) (723) (722) <5,976>
4 months .190** .208*** 999** 1,106** 46 277 24,972
(.083) (.079) (478) (465) (507) (521) <12,673>
6 months .172** .181*** 906** 958** 53 341 39,006
(.071) (.066) (412) (387) (404) (405) <19,794>
12 months .154*** .186*** 809** 996*** 140 552** 81,764
(.056) (.048) (322) (285) (281) (273) <41,500>
Weighted Yes No Yes No Yes No
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Notes: The table presents intensive margin estimates of the elasticity, the earnings response of the marginal buncher defined as the earnings
response at the first kink and the average response of recipients for the baseline specification and each alternative specification. For recipients
awarded DI in 2015, I add recipients to the right of the kink until the fraction of recipients with positive earnings is the same as for recipients
awarded DI in 2014 in order to adjust for extensive margin responses. For the weighted estimates, recipients awarded DI in 2014 are weighted





where P(I = 1) denotes the probability of being awarded DI in 2015 and P(Ii = 1|xi)
is estimated with a logit model using the covariates in Table A.2 (including uncapped DI benefits) as control variables. Both groups are
weighted by a triangular kernel weight in estimations. Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated by a pairs cluster bootstrap which
accounts for clustering at the individual level using 500 replications. Earnings are measured in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD = 7.5).
As I am unable to impose functional form assumptions in the assignment variable (i.e. the DI award
date) due to the nature of the empirical design, a potential worry using observations further away from
the cut-off arises if earnings potential is correlated with DI award due to e.g. health improving or
worsening over time. To further investigate the validity of my findings, I examine whether earnings are
correlated with the assignment variable. Appendix Table A.4 reports regression discontinuity estimates
using no trend in the assignment variable, a linear trend and a quadratic trend, respectively.35 This is the
average effect of being subject to the more lenient benefit phase-out policy (i.e. kink at $8,000 versus
$4,937) in the population. I use a triangular kernel and 9 months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off
as in the main specification. Reassuringly, the point estimates (with control variables) are very similar
across the different specifications. The point estimate is $117 using no functional form in the assignment
35The regression can be expressed as yit = α + f (xi)+β Ixi<c + δXi + εit where y is earnings, x is the assignment variable
(i.e. the DI award date) and c is the cut-off date at 1st of January 2015. Ixi<c is a dummy equal to 1 if being awarded DI before
the cut-off date. X is a vector of covariates and ε is the error term. f (x) takes the functional form for each specification as
explained in text.
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variable, $113 with linear trends and $108 for the quadratic specification, respectively.
Finally, I investigate how income effects would affect the elasticity estimate. As recipients awarded
DI in 2015 or later receive slightly higher levels of DI benefits on average due to institutional changes,
this might induce recipients awarded DI before the cut-off date to work more compared to recipients
awarded DI after the cut-off through an income effect. While evidence on intensive margin responses
to the benefit generosity is scarce, Gelber et al. (2017a) estimate an income elasticity of earnings with
respect to DI benefits of about 1.36 Using the weighting approach, the difference in DI benefits between
the two groups in the estimation sample is about 1 percent. Assuming an income elasticity of 1, i.e.
recipients reduce earnings by 1 percent if the level of DI benefits increase by 1 percent, a back-of-the-
envelope calculation yields an elasticity of .166 or about 6 percent lower than the baseline estimate.37
This suggests that the upward bias in the elasticity due to income effects is small in this context.38
6 Extensive Margin Responses
Since a lower kink point increases the average tax for recipients with earnings above the kink, it is
possible that the lower kink induces some recipients to stop working altogether. In this section, I estimate
the magnitude of the extensive margin response in my setting. I then investigate how extensive margin
responses affect the estimate of the intensive margin earnings elasticity.
6.1 Empirical Analysis
To assess the extensive margin responses of being subject to the different benefit phase-out policies, I
implement a simple regression discontinuity (RD) design. Specifically, I run the following regression:
yit = α + f (xi)+β Ixi<c +δXi + εit (5)
where y is the outcome variable (such as a dummy for having positive earnings), x is the assignment
variable (i.e. the DI award date) and c is the cut-off date at 1st of January 2015. f (x) is an unknown
functional form of the assignment variable and Ixi<c is a dummy equal to 1 if individual i is awarded DI
before the cut-off date. X is a vector of covariates and ε is the error term. β is the coefficient of interest,
and measures the average effect of being subject to the more lenient benefit phase-out policy (i.e. kink
at $8,000 versus $4,937) on labor force participation in the population. The validity of my RD design
hinges on recipients not being able to manipulate the assignment variable, which I outlined in Section
4.3. I use the same baseline specifications as for the main empirical strategy using a triangular kernel, 9
months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off and no trend in the assignment variable (i.e. f (x) = 0).
For consistency, I also incorporate the same weighting approach as outlined in Section 4.
Table 4 reports estimates of Equation 5 for the full estimation sample. Column 1 and 2 shows
that the more lenient exemption threshold increased labor force participation by about 0.8 percentage
points or about 7 percent compared to recipients with the kink at $4,937. This estimate is robust to
including trends in the assignment variable, yielding a point estimate of .010 for a linear trend and .009
36Most evidence on the effect of benefit generosity on labor supply for DI beneficiaries investigate extensive margin re-
sponses. See e.g. Gruber (2000); Marie & Castello (2012); Deuchert & Eugster (2019).
37If recipients awarded DI after the cut-off decrease earnings by 1 percent, earnings of the marginal bunching individual
would be .99 · (z∗+△z) = .99 · (4937+944) = $5,822. The estimates earnings response of the marginal bunching individual
would then be 5822−4937 = $885. Plugging this into Equation 4 yields an elasticity of .166.
38As the general level of DI benefits in Norway is higher on average than in the US, it is possible that the income effect for
Norwegian DI recipients is smaller than for US recipients . In that case, the bias represents an upper bound.
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for a quadratic trend, respectively. Column 3 and 4 shows that the more lenient exemption threshold
significantly decreased the average tax of participating in the labor market by about 3 percentage points,
or 8 percent. In order to shed light on the magnitude of this response, I follow Kostøl & Mogstad (2014)
and calculate the elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to the participation tax rate.39
The results suggest an elasticity of about 0.11 which is comparable to similar studies on DI recipients.40
Figure A.2 (b) shows how the elasticity of labor force nonparticipation vary with bandwidth selection.
Although the estimate is somewhat higher if I use 1 or 2 months of bandwidth on each side of the cut-off,
the estimated elasticity appears relatively robust to bandwidth selection.
Table 4: Extensive Margin Responses and Implied Elasticity of Labor Force Nonparticipation
Labor force Participation Nonparticipation Observations
participation tax rate elasticity (ε) <individuals>
Full sample .008* .007* -.032*** -.032*** .106* .104* 59,753
(2016-2017) (.004) (.004) (.001) (.001) (.058) (.056) <30,317>
[.109] [.109] [.401] [.400]
Weighted Yes No Yes No Yes No
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Notes: The table reports estimates of labor force participation, the participation tax rate and the implied elasticity of non-participation using
a regression where the outcome variable is regressed on a dummy which is equal to 1 if recipients are awarded DI in 2014 using a triangular
kernel. The sample consists of totally disabled recipients awarded DI between 1st of April 2014 and 31st of September 2015. For the weighted





where P(I = 1) denotes the
probability of being awarded DI in 2015 and P(Ii = 1|xi) is estimated with a logit model using the covariates in Table A.2 (including uncapped
DI benefits) as control variables. Labor force participation is defined positive earnings excluding holiday pay. The participation tax rate is
defined as the implied tax of participating in the labor force including income taxes and the implicit tax of DI benefits. The elasticity of labor
force nonparticipation is defined as ε = ∆(1−LFP)/(1−LFP)
∆PT R/PT R where ∆(1−LFP) =−∆LFP is the estimated effect on labor force nonparticipation.
LFP and PT R are the mean labor force participation and participation tax rate of recipients awarded DI in 2015 (in brackets). ∆PT R is the
difference in participation tax rates between the different benefit phase-out policies evaluated for the earnings distribution of recipients awarded
DI in 2015. Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated by a pairs cluster bootstrap which accounts for clustering at the individual level
using 500 replications.
6.2 Elasticity Estimation with Extensive Margin Responses
I now investigate how extensive margin responses would affect the estimated intensive margin earnings
elasticity. As shown in Section 6.1, the lower kink induces some recipients to stop working altogether
because of a higher participation tax rate for earnings above the kink. Because this only affects individ-
uals who would have earned above the kink, the density above the kink would shift downwards. This
would have a knock-on effect and shift the density below the kink upwards and shift the cumulative
distribution to the left. Because of this, I would overstate the response of the marginal bunching indi-
vidual, and hence also the intensive margin earnings elasticity. To assess the magnitude of this bias, I do
a simulation exercise following the same steps as Ruh & Staubli (2019). I base my simulations on the
utility function in Equation 2 with the addition of individuals having a fixed cost of labor force partici-
pation q that is smoothly distributed across the population. Individuals choose earnings z to maximize
39The elasticity of labor force nonparticipation is defined as ε = ∆(1−LFP)/(1−LFP)
∆PT R/PT R
, where ∆(1− LFP) = −∆LFP is the
estimated effect of labor force nonparticipation being subject to the more lenient benefit phase-out policy, LFP is the mean
labor force participation for the recipients with the (low) kink at $4,937, ∆PT R is the difference in the participation tax rate
and PT R is the average participation tax rate for recipients with the (low) kink at $4,937.
40Kostøl & Mogstad (2014) estimate an elasticity of labor force nonparticipation with respect to participation taxes of about
0.12. Ruh & Staubli (2019) find an elasticity of about 0.10.
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subject to the budget constraint c = B+ z−T (z;B). Individuals will only participate in the labor force
if q ≤ u∗(c,z)− u0 for some z > 0, where u0 denotes the utility from nonparticipation. If the tax of
participating in the labor force increases, some individuals would stop working because of the fixed cost
q. This allows me to investigate how taxes create extensive margin responses and how it affects the
estimated intensive margin elasticity.
The simulation exercise proceeds as follows. First, I calibrate a vector of ability parameters n that
best resembles the empirical ability distribution.41 I assume that n follows a gamma distribution because
this distribution most closely resembles the empirical distribution. Appendix Figure A.3 shows that
the simulated probability and cumulative distributions closely resembles the empirical distributions.
Second, I assign individuals to the two different tax systems considered in this paper, one with a kink at
$4,937 and the other with a kink at $8,000. I then calculate each individual’s optimal earnings z using
the estimated elasticity e = .177 from Section 5. Third, I calibrate a vector of fixed costs q following
Liebman (2002). Specifically, I draw a random fixed cost from a uniform distribution with a lower limit
of zero and an upper limit equal to the difference between the individual’s utility at the optimal z with
no (implicit) taxes and the utility with zero earnings. These fixed costs are then divided by a scalar so
that the extensive margin response is consistent with the response estimated in the empirical analysis.
Next, I estimate the intensive margin elasticity considering the three following scenarios: In the first
scenario, I assume no fixed cost of labor force participation, i.e. q = 0. The second scenario considers
individuals with q ≥ 0 who work only if the utility from working is larger than the utility from nonpar-
ticipation. I then estimate the elasticity as in Section 5 but ignore the adjustment procedure for extensive
margin responses. In the third scenario, I estimate the elasticity incorporating the adjustment procedure
outlined in Section 4. Specifically, I add individuals to the right of the kink for treated individuals until
the fraction of working individuals is the same as for non-treated individuals. I assume that the distribu-
tion of recipients who have stopped working because of the fixed cost of participation is the same as the
observed earnings distribution above the kink.
The results from the simulation exercise for the different cases are shown in Table 5 (column 1) and
the corresponding empirical estimates (column 2). With no extensive margin responses, the elasticity
is precisely estimated. If I allow for a fixed cost of labor force participation, ignoring the extensive
margin response induces a large bias in the estimated elasticity of 71% in this context. However, the
bias is small when I incorporate the adjustment procedure explained above. As reported in the table,
the adjusted elasticity estimate is slightly smaller than the theoretical elasticity, but the bias is only
2%. This suggests that the adjustment procedure works well in this context. Appendix Figure A.4
shows a graphical representation of the estimation procedure comparing the cumulative distributions
for the simulation exercise and the empirical sample, respectively. From the figures, it is clear that I
overestimate the response of the marginal buncher when I do not account for extensive margin responses
41Under the assumption that ability, or potential earnings being the same for the two groups in the estimation sample, non-
treated recipients at the same point in the CDF as treated recipients should resemble the potential earnings of treated with
earnings below the kink. To construct the empirical ability distribution, i.e. the earnings distribution if there were no (implicit)
taxes on earnings, I assume that ability of treated is n = F−10 (z) when F1 = F0 for treated with earnings z ≤ z
∗, where Fj(z) is
the cumulative distribution for treatment status j = 0,1. For treated with earnings z∗ > z, I use the estimated elasticity e = .177
to calculate the earnings response which yields ability n = z( 1−t01−t1 )
e.
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as the CDF for the treated group has shifted to the left when some individuals above the kink have
stopped working.
Table 5: Simulation Exercise and Adjustment for Extensive Margin Responses
Simulation Empirical
Without extensive margin responses .177 (0%)
With extensive margin responses
unadjusted .303 (71%) .315
adjusted .173 (-2%) .177
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Notes: The table shows intensive margin elasticity estimates with and without adjustment for extensive margin responses for the simulated and
empirical earnings distributions. For the simulated earnings distributions (see text for details), I assume an elasticity of e = .177. In the first
scenario, I assume no extensive margin responses. In the second scenario, I calibrate a fixed cost of labor force participation that resembles
the estimated empirical extensive margin response. For the unadjusted estimates, I calculate the intensive margin elasticity using observations
(individuals) with positive earnings only. For estimates adjusted for extensive margin responses, I add observations (individuals) to the right
of the kink until the fraction of observations (individuals) with positive earnings is the same between the two samples. In parentheses, I report
the bias in the estimated elasticity relative to the theoretical elasticity.
7 Elasticities using Bunching Methods
In most studies that use bunching at kinks to identify a behavioral response, the counterfactual distribu-
tion, i.e. what the distribution would have looked like without the kink, is unobserved. As pointed out
by Blomquist et al. (2019), the amount of bunching at the kink is not informative about responses unless
one is willing to impose restrictions on the counterfactual distribution. The common way to deal with
this issue in the literature is to use the observed density to estimate the counterfactual density using a
flexible polynomial. As a result, identification of the behavioral response depends on the assumed shape
of the counterfactual distribution. However, without information on the true counterfactual density, it is
not clear whether the polynomial approach provides a valid estimate of the counterfactual distribution,
and therefore whether it provides a valid estimate of the behavioral responses.
To shed light on this matter, I re-estimate the earnings elasticity for the sample of recipients with
the kink at $4,937 using bunching methods common in the literature. My first approach follows Chetty
et al. (2011) and fits a flexible polynomial to the observed distribution to estimate the amount of bunching
around the kink. Specifically, I group individuals into earnings bins of $400 and estimate a regression










γk1(z j = k)+ ε j (7)
where c j is the number of individuals in bin j, z j is the earning level of bin j, zL and zU is the lower
and upper limit of the excluded range around the kink and p is the order of the polynomial. The coun-
terfactual density is obtained as the predicted values from Equation 7 omitting the contribution of the
dummies in the excluded range, i.e. ĉ j = ∑
p
i=0 β̂i (z j)
i. This density is then adjusted so that the estimated
missing mass above the kink is equal to the estimated bunching mass around the kink.42 The estimated
amount of “bunching”, or excess mass around the kink is then determined by the sum of the predicted
values of the dummies, i.e. ∑z
U
k=zL
γ̂k1(z j = k). This estimate is then normalized by the estimated density
42This is achieved by upward shifts in the counterfactual distribution to the right of the kink, which is done in increments
until the counterfactual satisfies the integration constraint.
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at the kink. Multiplying this estimate with the binwidth obtains an estimate of the earnings response of
the marginal buncher with the same interpretation as in my main estimation approach. Plugging this into
Equation 4 yields the estimated earnings elasticity using the polynomial approach. As a comparison to
the polynomial approach, I estimate the amount of “bunching” and the earnings elasticity using the same
framework, but instead using the sample of recipients awarded DI before the cut-off as the counterfactual
density. This should give an indication of how well the polynomial approach works in this context.
Figure 6 provides a graphical representation of the two approaches that I consider. In Panel (a),
the gray area indicates the estimated amount of “bunching” using the non-parametric approach where
recipients with DI award before the cut-off serve as the counterfactual density for recipients awarded
DI after the cut-off. The vertical gray dashed lines indicate the lower and upper limits of the excluded
region and are determined by visual inspection. The estimated amount of “bunching” (b) amounts to
2.16 and implies that the excess mass around the kink indicated by the gray area amounts to 2.16 of
the counterfactual density at the kink. The estimated elasticity (e = .176) is almost indistinguishable
from the estimated elasticity in my main empirical approach using the cumulative distributions of the
two groups (e = .177). Panel (b) shows the estimated “bunching” and elasticity using the polynomial
approach where I use the same excluded region as in the non-parametric approach. The dashed line
indicates the estimated counterfactual density using a 10th degree polynomial fitted to the empirical
distribution. The estimated “bunching” and elasticity (e = .179) are remarkably similar to the non-
parametric approach suggesting that the polynomial approach provides a valid estimate of earnings
responses in this context.
Figure 6: Graphical Representation of Bunching Estimates
(a) Non-parametric approach
b: 2.16 (.57)
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Notes: Panel (a) illustrates the bunching estimate using the non-parametric approach, where bunching is estimated using the earnings distri-
bution of recipients awarded DI between April 1st and December 31st 2014 (gray line) as a counterfactual density for recipients awarded DI
between January 1st and September 30th 2015 (black line), both distributions using $400 bins. The vertical dashed lines indicate the bunching
region where the estimated bunching is illustrated by the gray area. The red dashed line and the red solid line indicate the kink point in the






P(I = 1) denotes the probability of being awarded DI in 2015 and P(Ii = 1|xi) is estimated with a logit model using the covariates in Table
A.2 (including uncapped DI benefits) as control variables. Both groups are weighted by a triangular kernel weight. Panel (b) illustrates the
bunching estimate using the polynomial approach, where a 10th degree polynomial is fitted to the empirical distribution of recipients awarded
DI between January 1st and September 30th 2015, illustrated by the gray dashed line. Standard errors are calculated by a pairs cluster bootstrap
which accounts for clustering at the individual level using 500 replications. Earnings are measured in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD = 7.5).
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Table 6 reports estimates of the elasticity (e), bunching (b) and the earnings response of the marginal
buncher (△z) for each approach. Note that the polynomial approach is unaffected by the weighting ap-
proach as it only uses data on recipients to the right of the cut-off. In addition to the approaches discussed
in this section, I estimate the earnings elasticity following Saez (2010) which relies on a linear approx-
imation of the counterfactual density around the kink.43 While this elasticity estimate is slightly higher
than in the main empirical approach, it is qualitatively similar. For the polynomial approach, the esti-
mated responses are based on a 10th degree polynomial fitted to the empirical distribution. As in most
bunching applications, it is not clear how to decide the order of the polynomial in this setting. I therefore
perform a robustness analysis and estimate responses using alternative orders of the polynomial fitted
to the empirical distribution. Appendix Table A.5 reports estimates of “bunching” and the earnings
elasticity using polynomials of order 8 - 12, and Appendix Figure A.5 provides a graphical representa-
tion.44 The estimated elasticity range from .150 to .194 suggesting that the estimates are fairly robust to
alternative specifications of the counterfactual density.
Table 6: Earnings Elasticity Estimates from Bunching Methods
Earnings response ($) Observations
Elasticity (e) Bunching (b) Marginal buncher (∆z) <individuals>
CDF method .177*** .198*** 2.36** 2.67*** 944** 1,067*** 59,753
(.066) (.059) (.98) (.89) (392) (357) <30,317>
Bunching methods:
Counterfactual: .176*** .184*** 2.16*** 2.26*** 863*** 902*** 59,753
Awarded DI in 2014 (.047) (.045) (.58) (.55) (230) (218) <30,317>
Counterfactual: .179*** .179*** 2.18*** 2.18*** 873*** 873*** 26,950
Fitted polynomial (.055) (.055) (.67) (.67) (267) (267) <13,697>
Saez method .190*** .190*** 2.32*** 2.32*** 928*** 928*** 26,950
(.051) (.051) (.63) (.63) (250) (250) <13,697>
Weighted Yes No Yes No Yes No
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Notes: The table reports intensive margin estimates of the elasticity, bunching and the earnings response of the marginal buncher defined as
the earnings response at the first kink for four different methods (see text for details). The sample consists of totally DI recipients awarded DI
between 1st of April 2014 and 30th of September 2015. For the weighted estimates, recipients awarded DI in 2014 are weighted by propensity





where P(I = 1) denotes the probability of being awarded DI in 2015 and P(Ii = 1|xi) is estimated
with a logit model using the covariates in Table A.2 (including uncapped DI benefits) as control variables. Both groups are weighted by a
triangular kernel weight in all estimations. For the specification using a fitted polynomial, I use a 10th degree polynomial fitted to the empirical
density using the sample of recipients awarded DI in 2015. Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated by a pairs cluster bootstrap which
accounts for clustering at the individual level using 500 replications. Earnings are measured in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD = 7.5).
A caveat with this exercise is that even though my analysis suggests that the polynomial approach
works well in this context, the same may not be true in other settings. In general, the performance of
the polynomial approach will depend on choices made by the researcher, and in particular the order
of the polynomial and the upper and lower limit of the excluded region. Moreover, the approach will
43The elasticity is derived from Equation (5) in Saez, 2010 which can be solved explicitly for the elasticity e:
B = z∗[T −1] h(z
∗)−+h(z
∗)+/T
2 where T = (
1−t0
1−t1
)e. B denotes the estimated fraction of “bunching” in the population, z∗is the
kink point and h(z∗)− and h(z∗)+ denotes the estimated densities just below and just above the kink, respectively.
44Based on visual inspection, orders lower than 8 clearly underfits the empirical distribution in my setting.
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depend on the size of the kink and the size of the earnings response. If bunching is less sharp, deciding
the excluded region is often not clear. Additionally, one often relies on using observations further away
from the kink to estimate the counterfactual density. The predicted density then may serve as a poor
counterfactual density around the kink.
8 Fiscal Effects and Policy Implications
In this section, I assess fiscal effects of different benefit offset policies for the government and program’s
beneficiaries, and the associated policy implications. While a more lenient policy may improve welfare
of recipients and increase tax revenues, it might increase expenditures on DI benefits. It could also
increase program inflow as the program becomes more desirable for potential applicants. Therefore, it
is not clear how such policies should be designed and how different policies affect total program costs.
To shed light on these matters, I examine implications of two alternative policies on recipients’
disposable income, DI benefits paid, income taxes and net public expenditures. The alternative policies
are compared to the baseline policy with the kink at $4,937. The first policy I consider is relaxing
the exemption threshold to $8,000 which is the temporary policy for recipients awarded DI in 2014 or
earlier. To calculate effects of this policy, I estimate Equation 5 for each outcome that I consider for the
main estimation sample. The second policy I consider is abolishing the phase-out of DI benefits entirely.
Under this policy, recipients would keep full DI benefits regardless of how much they earn. In both
scenarios, recipients would still have to pay regular income taxes. To calculate effects of this policy, I
decompose responses into intensive and extensive margin responses. For the intensive margin response,
I estimate responses in the same way as in the main empirical approach for recipients with earnings
below the kink.45 For recipients with earnings above the kink, I calculate responses using the estimated
intensive margin elasticity (e = .177).46 To calculate the extensive margin response, I use the estimated
elasticity of labor force nonparticipation from Section 6 and calculate the number of recipients who
would start working under the alternative policy.47 I assume that the earnings distribution of additional
working recipients is the same as the observed earnings distribution above the kink. Lastly, I calculate
the changes in recipients’ disposable income, taxes and government expenditures based on the earnings
responses.
The results from the two alternative policy changes are reported in Table 7. The two first columns
show that relaxing the kink from $4,937 to $8,000 significantly increases recipients’ disposable income
with $83 on average for the weighted approach. This effect is mainly driven by working recipients who
increase labor supply, while a few recipients start working under the more lenient policy. Most recipients
do not experience increased disposable income as they do not work under either policy. While estimated
government expenditures on DI benefits increase with $15 on average per recipient, this effect is offset
by an increase in income taxes by $42. Because of this, estimated net government expenditures decrease
with $27 per recipient. However, this effect is too imprecisely estimated to draw firm conclusions.
Column 3 and 4 show that abolishing the phase-out of DI benefits entirely increases disposable income
45The earnings response can be expressed as F0(z+△z) = F1(z) where △z is the earnings response, F0 is the CDF of
recipients with DI award before the cut-off, and F0 the CDF of recipients awarded DI after the cut-off.
46The earnings response can be expressed as △z = z( 1−t01−t1 )
e − z where △z is the earnings response, z is current earnings, t0
is the marginal tax rate below the kink and t1 is the marginal tax rate above the kink.
47More specifically, the change in labor force participation is calculated as △LFP = −ε △PT RPT R (1− LFP) where △PT R
denotes the policy-induced reduction in participation tax rate.
27
by $183 which is more than twice as much as the first alternative policy. DI benefits paid and income
taxes also increase more. Although net government expenditures are estimated to be $22 lower for each
recipient than under the current policy, they are slightly higher than under the first alternative policy.
Again, I lack precision to draw firm conclusions.
Table 7: Annual Fiscal Effects of Increased Incentives to Work
Outcome: Relax kink Abolish kink
Disposable income ($) 83*** 100*** 183*** 191***
(17) (17) (26) (24)
DI benefits ($) 15 1 50 51
(11) (11) (122) (109)
Payroll taxes ($) 42*** 52*** 72*** 76***
(12) (12) (15) (14)
Net expenses ($) -27 -51** -22 -26
(22) (24) (22) (22)
Implied elasticity of induced entry .07 .09 .01 .01
Weighted Yes No Yes No
Individuals 30,317 30,317
Observations 59,753 59,753
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Notes: The table reports estimates of alternative benefit phase-out policies on annual disposable income, DI benefits, payroll taxes and net
public expenditures. The first alternative policy considers relaxing the annual kink from $4,937 to $8,000. Column 1 and 2 report estimates
using a regression where outcome variables are regressed on a dummy which is equal to 1 if recipients are awarded DI in 2014. Columns 3
and 4 report estimates of abolishing the DI phase-put policy entirely (see text for details). In all estimations, I use the full sample of totally
disabled recipients awarded DI between 1st of April 2014 and 31st of September 2015 and a triangular kernel. For the weighted estimates,





where P(I = 1) denotes the probability
of being awarded DI in 2015 and P(Ii = 1|xi) is estimated with a logit model using the covariates in Table A.2 (including uncapped DI benefits)
as control variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated by a pairs cluster bootstrap which accounts for clustering at the individual
level using 500 replications. All variables are measured in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD = 7.5).
It is important to keep in mind that the estimated effects are specific to my estimation sample of
recipients with only 1-4 years on DI receipt. Therefore, it is possible that the alternative policies would
have different implications for the full sample of DI recipients. As shown in Table 1, the full sample of
recipients differ in some dimensions compared to the estimation sample. In particular, they are slightly
older, have spent more years on DI and have about 50% higher earnings on average. It is therefore likely
that the alternative policies would have larger impacts for the full sample of recipients. Additionally, it
is possible that the long-run earnings responses, which my fiscal calculations are based upon, are higher
than the observed responses if responses are attenuated by e.g. lumpy hours or imperfect information
about the benefit phase-out. In that case, my estimates represent a lower bound of the true effects.
While my exercise shows that the alternative policies might decrease program costs for current
recipients, these estimates ignore the possibility that a more generous DI program could induce more
program entry.48 To shed light on this matter, I calculate how elastic program inflow would have to be in
order to not increase program costs. Specifically, I calculate the elasticity of induced entry as in Kostøl
48A more generous DI program could also lead to fewer program exits by current beneficiaries in the long run. However,
this effect is likely to be small because the exit rate from DI is already very low.
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& Mogstad (2014), defined as the percentage increase in the number of DI recipients relative to the
percentage increase in disposable income as a DI recipient.49 Table 7 shows that relaxing the kink yields
an induced entry elasticity of about 0.07, while abolishing the disincentives to work entirely yields a
very low elasticity of about 0.01. These calculations suggest that both programs are likely to increase
program costs.50
9 Conclusion
In this paper, I have examined recipients’ labor supply responses to the financial incentives induced by
the benefit phase-out. Using earnings distributions in a local experiment that assigned recipients to dif-
ferent benefit offset policies, I provide transparent and credible identification of labor supply responses
of DI beneficiaries. I find evidence of large behavioral responses around the exemption threshold sug-
gesting that working recipients would have earned considerably more if benefits were not phased out
above the threshold. I also find that recipients subject to the higher exemption threshold are more likely
to participate in the labor force. My framework is also useful for understanding responses to kinked bud-
get sets. My findings suggest that common estimation strategies in the literature that identify behavioral
responses using bunching at kinks in the budget set performed well in this context.
As my study investigates recipients of the Norwegian DI program, one needs to exercise caution in
applying these findings to other countries. In particular, the exemption threshold in Norway is lower
than in most other countries. This difference is important as my main estimation strategy exploits re-
cipients who locate around the threshold. Furthermore, I advise readers to exercise the usual caution in
interpreting findings from a local experiment. In this context, the study considers recipients who have
entered the DI program fairly recently and have a lower earnings capacity compared to recipients with
longer spells on the program. Therefore, it is likely that responses are larger for the full population of
DI recipients.
The estimated labor supply responses are particularly useful for guiding policymakers in how dif-
ferent benefit offset policies will affect recipients’ disposable income and program costs. My findings
indicate that relaxing the exemption threshold increases disposable income and reduces costs for cur-
rent recipients of the program. A caveat with this study is that it is not informative about the level of
increased program inflow when recipients are allowed to keep a larger share of their benefits as they
earn more. I do, however, calculate the size of induced entry that has to be generated by more generous
benefit offset policies in order to increase program costs. Based on findings in other studies, I conclude
that more generous policies will likely increase public expenditures.
49The elasticity is defined as εentry =
E(△NE)/E(B|Award=1)
P(Award=1)·E(△I|Award=1) where △NE is the change in net government expenditures
and △I is the change in disposable income between the current policy and the alternative policy.
B is DI benefits. I assume that new entries have the same earnings distribution and DI benefits as recipients with earnings
above the kink as the alternative programs gives no further incentives for entries who would earn below the kink. Furthermore,
I assume a probability of award of 0.85 which is roughly the award rate in the Norwegian DI program.
50While the literature on induced entry of DI recipients is somewhat inconclusive, Gruber (2000) reports induced entry
elasticities in the range of 0.28-0.36 in Canada. Mullen & Staubli (2016) and Hoynes & Moffitt (1999) report an elasticity of
about 1.2 in Austria and the US, respectively. In contrast, Campolieti & Riddell (2012) and Castello (2017) do not find any
evidence of induced entry in Canada and Spain, respectively.
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Appendix: Additional Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Balancing Tests of Pre-determined Covariates
Alternative sample:
Full sample Not from prior TDI programs
Dependent variable: (2 months around cut-off) (9 months around cut-off)
difference std. error p-value difference std. error p-value
Number of recipients -86 (307) .778 -155 (122) .206
Characteristics:
Age at DI award -.67* (.37) .072 -.27 (.25) .282
Fraction females .002 (.014) .902 -.004 (.009) .634
Years of schooling -.18*** (.06) .005 -.06 (.04) .108
Pre-disability earnings ($) -225 (468) .631 89 (301) .766
Projected DI benefits ($) -169 (234) .471 -5 (147) .971
Years since onset date -.12 (.12) .320 -.08 (.07) .232
Fraction cohabitants -.005 (.014) .745 -.012 (.009) .168
Number of children .01 (.04) .755 .008 (.025) .759
Fraction from TDI program -.013 (.009) .125 -.016** (.007) .013
Fraction from prior TDI programs -.015 (.013) .253 - - -
Joint test .176 .194
Observations 5,976 16,762
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Notes: The table reports results of a regression using a triangular kernel where each variable is regressed on a dummy which is equal to 1
if recipients are awarded DI in 2014. The full sample consist of totally disabled recipients awarded DI between 1st of November 2014 and
28th of February 2015. The alternative sample consists of recipients awarded DI between 1st of April 2014 to 30th of September 2015 and
excludes recipients who received temporary DI benefits before a reform in the temporary DI program in March 2010. Projected DI benefits are
defined as the level of DI benefits if recipients were awarded DI after 1st of January 2015. Years of schooling, cohabitant status and number
of children are measured in 2015. All other covariates are fixed over time. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the individual level
and are robust to heteroskedasticity. Monetary variables are measured in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD = 7.5).
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Table A.2: Balancing tests of Pre-determined Covariates: Weighted Estimates
mean: DI award
Dependent variable: apr-dec 2014 jan-sep 2015 difference (std. error) p-value
Net uncapped DI benefits ($) 27,647 28,405 28,741 -1,095*** (68) -337*** (69) <.001 <.001
Characteristics:
Age at DI award 46.68 47.34 47.02 -.34** (.17) .32* (.19) .048 .085
Fraction females .550 .531 .531 .019*** (.007) .000 (.007) .004 .962
Years of schooling 10.93 11.01 11.01 -.08*** (.03) .00 (.03) .008 .998
Pre-disability earnings ($) 59,557 60,304 60,224 -668*** (214) 80 (254) .002 .753
Years since DI onset date 6.89 6.12 6.12 .77*** (.06) .00 (.06) <.001 .948
Fraction cohabitants .504 .502 .507 -.003 (.007) -.005 (.007) .626 .457
Number of children 1.65 1.60 1.62 .03 (.02) -.02 (.02) .119 .314
Fraction from TDI program .913 .887 .890 .022*** (.004) -.003 (.005) <.001 .436
Fraction from prior TDI programs .498 .303 .305 .193*** (.006) -.002 (.006) <.001 .709
Joint test (p-value) <.001 .429
Weighted No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Observations 16,620 16,620 13,697 30,317
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Notes: The table reports weighted and unweighted means of recipients awarded DI before/after 1st of January 2015, the difference between
the weighted and unweighted means and the corresponding p-values. The sample consist of totally disabled recipients awarded DI between
1st of April 2014 and 31st of September 2015. Years of schooling, cohabitant status and number of children are measured in 2015. All other
covariates are constant over time. Means and the corresponding differences are weighted by a triangular kernel. For the weighted means and





where P(I = 1) denotes the
probability of being awarded DI in 2015 and P(Ii = 1|xi) is estimated with a logit model using the covariates in Table (including uncapped
DI benefits) as control variables. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the individual level and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Monetary variables are measured in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD = 7.5).
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Table A.3: Subsample Analysis of Earnings Responses
Earnings response ($) Observations
Elasticity (e) Marginal buncher (∆z) Average response <individuals>
Full sample .177*** .198*** 944** 1,067*** 157 531* 59,753
(2016-2017) (.066) (.059) (392) (357) (308) (307) <30,317>
Age
18-49 .115* .182*** 606 999*** 242 720* 27,029
(.069) (.064) (392) (383) (407) (422) <13,960>
50-66 .254*** .295*** 1,379*** 1,634*** 0 458 21,845
(.091) (.076) (536) (460) (492) (461) <11,896>
Gender
Male .181** .194*** 946** 1,021** 153 740 26,839
(.078) (.074) (446) (431) (488) (527) <13,600>
Female .185* .199** 1,022* 1,106** 232 335 32,914
(.097) (.084) (586) (514) (387) (345) <16,717>
Education
High .155 .176** 804 921* 331 759 24,133
(.098) (.084) (551) (482) (483) (501) <12,244>
Low .179** .218*** 972** 1,207*** -70 348 35,620
(.076) (.072) (459) (448) (413) (411) <18,073>
DI benefits
High .257*** .245*** 1,466*** 1,385*** 362 624 35,165
(.077) (.067) (486) (422) (421) (398) <17,912>
Low .151 .158* 766 804 214 371 24,588
(.096) (.090) (526) (496) (490) (480) <12,405>
Pre-DI earnings
High .189** .184** 931* 904** 299 865* 26,429
(.093) (.077) (496) (416) (492) (520) <13,482>
Low .179** .232*** 1,034** 1,384*** -107 209 33,324
(.080) (.065) (494) (418) (387) (358) <16,835>
Weighted Yes No Yes No Yes No
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Notes: The table presents intensive margin estimates of the elasticity, the earnings response of the marginal buncher defined as the earnings
response at the first kink and the average response of recipients for the full sample and by each subgroup. The sample consist of totally
DI recipients awarded DI between 1st of April 2014 and 30th of September 2015. For recipients awarded DI in 2015, I add recipients
to the right of the kink until the fraction of recipients with positive earnings is the same as for recipients awarded DI in 2014 in order to






where P(I = 1) denotes the probability of being awarded DI in 2015 and P(Ii = 1|xi) is estimated with a logit
model using the covariates in Table A.2 (including uncapped DI benefits) as control variables. Both groups are weighted by a triangular kernel
weight in estimations. Low education is defined as not finishing high school or less. High education is defined as high school education or
more. Low (uncapped) DI benefits is defined as receiving minimum benefit levels, and high DI benefits otherwise. Low (high) pre-DI earnings
are defined as less than or equal to (larger than) the sample median. Standard errors (in parentheses) are calculated by a pairs cluster bootstrap
which accounts for clustering at the individual level using 500 replications. Earnings are measured in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD = 7.5)
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Table A.4: Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Trends in running variable (DI award) Observations
Outcome: None Linear Quadratic <individuals>
Annual 117*** 151*** 113 117 108 112 59,753
earnings ($) (39) (39) (85) (86) (85) (85) <30,317>
[531] [513] [533] [530] [560] [552]
Controls Yes No Yes No Yes No
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Notes: The table reports results of regression discontinuity estimates using a triangular kernel for different specifications of the running
variable: No trend (differences in means), a common linear trend and a common quadratic trend. The sample consist of totally disabled
recipients awarded DI between 1st of April 2014 and 31st of September 2015. Controls include the variables in Table A.2, including (uncapped)
DI benefits and the implicit tax rate on DI benefits (equal to the benefit replacement rate). Results reports the coefficient of the dummy which
is equal to 1 if recipients are awarded DI in 2014. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the individual level and are robust to
heteroskedasticity. Dependent means in brackets. Earnings are measured in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD = 7.5).
Table A.5: Parametric Bunching Estimates for Alternative Orders of Polynomial
Observations
Order of polynomial: 8 9 10 11 12 <individuals>
Bunching (b) 1.83*** 1.97*** 2.18*** 2.17*** 2.37*** 59,753
(.51) (.53) (.67) (.64) (.78) <30,317>
Elasticity (e) .150*** .161*** .179*** .177*** .194***
(.042) (.044) (.055) (.053) (.064)
*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Notes: The table reports bunching and elasticity estimates from the parametric bunching method (see Section 7 for details) using alternative
orders of polynomial fitted to the empirical distribution. In the baseline specification I use a 10th order polynomial. The sample consist
of recipients awarded DI between January 1st and September 30th 2015 and weighted by a triangular kernel (assigning more weight to the
individuals awarded DI early in the year). Standard errors are calculated by a pairs cluster bootstrap which accounts for clustering at the
individual level using 500 replications.
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DI award: apr-dec 2013 DI award: jan-sep 2014  
Notes: Panel (a) shows the (weighted) pooled earnings distributions for 2016 and 2017 in $400 bins for recipients with positive earnings
awarded DI between April 1st and December 31st 2013 (gray line) and recipients awarded DI between January 1st and September 30th 2014
(black line). The red solid line indicates the kink point in the budget constraint for both groups. Both groups are weighted by a triangular
kernel weight in estimations. For recipients awarded DI in 2014, I add recipients to the right of the kink until the fraction of recipients with
positive earnings is the same as for recipients awarded DI in 2013 in order to adjust for extensive margin responses. Recipients awarded DI in





where P(I = 1) denotes the probability of being awarded DI in
2014 and P(Ii = 1|xi) is estimated with a logit model using the covariates in Table A.2 (including uncapped DI benefits) as control variables.
Panel (b) shows the corresponding cumulative distributions. The horizontal dashed line indicates the CDF at the kink for recipients awarded
DI in 2014. The vertical gray dashed line indicates earnings of the marginal buncher z∗+△z. Standard errors are calculated by a pairs cluster
bootstrap which accounts for clustering at the individual level using 500 replications. Earnings are measured in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD =
7.5).





















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Bandwidth
Notes: Panels (a) and (b) displays the weighted estimates for different bandwidth choices of the intensive margin elasticity (see Section 5.2 for
details) and the extensive margin elasticity (see Section 6 for details), respectively. The black solid line indicates the point estimates, and the
dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. Standard errors are calculated by a pairs cluster bootstrap which accounts for clustering at the
individual level using 500 replications. The red vertical line indicates the baseline specification of 9 months bandwidth. The sample consists
of totally disabled recipients awarded DI between 1st of January 2014 and 31st of December 2015.
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the empirical and simulated ability distributions (see Section 6 for details of how the empirical ability distribution is
constructed), and Panel (b) shows the corresponding cumulative distributions. For the empirical distributions, the sample consists of recipients
awarded DI between 1st of January and 30th of September 2015. The sample is weighted by a triangular kernel (putting more weight on
recipients awarded DI earlier in the year). For the simulated distribution, I calibrate a gamma distribution that best resembles the empirical
probability density distribution.
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Notes: Panel (a) shows the cumulative distributions from the simulated earnings distributions without adjustment for extensive margin re-
sponses and the estimated intensive margin elasticity. The earnings distributions are constructed using the simulated ability distributions in
Figure A.3, and are then split into two samples: One with a (low) kink at $4,937 indicated by the red solid line, and the other with a (high) kink
at $8,000 indicated by the red dashed line. I then construct earnings responses assuming quasi-linear utility and an elasticity e = .177 and cali-
brate a fixed cost of labor force participation that resembles the estimated empirical extensive margin response. Only individuals with earnings
larger than the fixed cost of labor force participation are used in the estimation. The horizontal dashed line indicates the CDF at the (low) kink
at $4,937. The vertical gray dashed line indicates earnings of the marginal buncher z∗+△z. Panel (b) follows the same procedure where I add
observations to the right of the kink for the sample with kink at $4,937 until the fraction of observations participating in the labor force is the
same between the two samples in order to adjust for extensive margin responses. I assume that the additional observations follow the same
distribution as the earnings distribution to the right of the kink. Panel (c) shows the corresponding (weighted) cumulative distributions and the
estimated intensive margin elasticity for the empirical sample, where the sample consists of recipients with positive earnings only. Panel (d)
shows the corresponding (weighted) cumulative distributions and the estimated intensive margin elasticity for the empirical sample, where I
add recipients to the right of the kink until the fraction of individuals with positive earnings is the same between the two samples. Standard
errors are calculated by a pairs cluster bootstrap which accounts for clustering at the individual level using 500 replications.
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Figure A.5: Parametric Bunching Estimates for Alternative Orders of Polynomial
(a) 8th degree
b: 1.83 (.51)
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Notes: The figures illustrate the parametric bunching approach using alternative specifications of the polynomial fitted to the empirical distri-
bution which is grouped into $400 bins. The vertical dashed lines indicate the excluded region, and the red solid line indicate the kink point.
The sample consist of recipients awarded DI between January 1st and September 30th 2015 and weighted by a triangular kernel (assigning
more weight to the individuals awarded DI early in the year). Standard errors are calculated by a pairs cluster bootstrap which accounts for
clustering at the individual level using 500 replications. Earnings are measured in 2016 dollars (NOK/USD = 7.5).
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